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Policy-makers across Europe and the
United States want growth and jobs,
desperately seeking measures to
reinvigorate their flagging recoveries.
Researchers at the Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP) have spent many years
thinking about the fundamental question
that underlies that search – what drives
productivity growth?
The last issue of CentrePiece described
the substantial body of CEP research
evidence on the important role of
competition in raising productivity. One
way it does that is by promoting
innovation: in an effort to get ahead of
their competitors, firms come up with
new ideas for products – think of Steve
Jobs’ Apple. Firms also find better ways of
making their existing products: in this
issue, Tim Leunig and Joachim Voth 
show the huge growth benefits of such
‘process innovation’ in the cotton and 
car industries.
Competition policy can have a
significant impact in support of
innovation and growth, but public policy
can also influence innovation more
directly. In our cover story, CEP’s director
John Van Reenen outlines the Centre’s
work on fiscal incentives for business
spending on research and development
(R&D). The evidence indicates that R&D
tax credits can be highly effective in
encouraging innovation.
The skills of the workforce are
another important contributor to
growth. Elsewhere in the magazine are
articles on the two ends of Britain’s
distribution of what economists call
‘human capital’. Hilary Steedman
discusses the NEETs – young people,
often with few qualifications, who are
‘not in education, employment or
training’. And CEP’s research director
Stephen Machin describes the growing
trend of students staying in university
after graduation so as to acquire further
qualifications.
The boom in postgraduate education
is increasing inequality among people
who have degrees as well as more
broadly in the labour market. Henry
Overman and Steve Gibbons also focus
on ‘unequal Britain’, examining the
reality of regional disparities. Their
critique of the foundations of successive
governments’ urban and regional
policies suggests that a great deal of
time and public money has been wasted
on policies that do little either to reduce
inequality or promote growth.
Finally, CEP’s Nobel laureate Chris
Pissarides compares the records of
Europe and the United States on job
creation, especially in the potential
growth sectors of healthcare, education
and business services. His findings are yet
another illustration of the powerful
impact of public policy on employment.
The key is to figure out which policies
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In the last CentrePiece, John Van Reenen
stressed the importance of competition and
labour market flexibility for productivity growth.
His latest in CEP’s ‘big ideas’ series describes
the impact of research on how policy-makers
can influence innovation more directly –







n the wake of the Great
Recession, the UK is hardly
alone in looking for sources of
economic growth. Economists
and many other commentators
agree that technological
innovation must be at the heart of long-
run growth. It is also widely understood
that left to itself the market is unlikely to
provide enough incentives for innovation.
This ‘market failure’ is primarily
because only a small proportion of the
benefits of invention are captured by the
firm or individual who spends money and
time on research. Most of the benefits of
invention ‘spill over’ to other firms who
can copy the new idea without having to
pay the upfront research costs. For
example, it took a lot of effort to invent
the automobile and the personal
computer – but once they were invented,
imitators crowded in.
This means that there will be too little
spent on research and development
(R&D) from the point of view of society
as a whole. Intellectual property rights,
such as patents and copyright, were
designed to protect inventors and
increase their incentive to innovate. But
in most cases patents can be designed
around so they do not fully eliminate the
market failure.
So can there be a role for public
policy in stimulating innovation? Is it
driven by fundamental factors, such as
culture and luck, which are beyond the
ability of governments to influence
except in the most minor ways? 
CEP research has challenged the fatalistic
attitude that innovation is not amenable
to government action. One direct way to
influence innovation is through the tax
system, in particular by offering a tax
break for business spending on R&D.
I started working on fiscal incentives
for R&D in the mid-1990s after being
shocked to discover that the share of UK
national income spent on business R&D
had declined since the late 1970s. In just
about every other developed country, it
had been rising.
The United States introduced an R&D
tax credit in 1981 under Ronald Reagan,
but the UK Treasury had always resisted
the idea, arguing that firms were unlikely
to increase their R&D efforts significantly
in response. Evaluations of the US system
seemed to show, however, that after a
few teething problems, American firms
had responded to these tax incentives.
Working with Bronwyn Hall of the
University of California at Berkeley, our
review of all the existing evidence
showed that when researchers used good
quality firm-level data and tracked
companies over time, they found that tax
credits stimulated significant American
R&D spending (Hall and Van Reenen,
2000). Were UK firms likely to be so
much more lethargic than their
counterparts across the Atlantic?
At that time, international evidence
on the effectiveness of innovation tax
policy was almost non-existent. No one
had even collected systematic information
on the tax benefits to R&D across
countries over time – not the
International Monetary Fund, the OECD,
the World Bank or the United Nations.
Together with Rachel Griffith (now
deputy research director of the Institute
for Fiscal Studies), we put together a
team and embarked on a major effort to
measure the impact of the tax system on
the costs of R&D capital across all the
major economies over 20 years. A
downside of this was that we had to
wade through many dusty tomes of
rather tedious tax and accounting rules.
Once we had accomplished that
arduous task, we were able to show that
there had been a major shift towards
R&D tax credits and away from direct
subsidies. One of the advantages of tax
credits over the more traditional grants
was that the government could simply
set the rules and it did not have to get
involved with ‘picking winners’.
More importantly perhaps, we
combined the tax data with information
on national R&D and showed that tax
credits had a large effect on increasing
business R&D. Although a 10% reduction
in the tax costs only increased private
sector R&D spending by about 1% in the
first year after an R&D tax credit was
introduced, in the long run R&D volumes
rose by a full 10% (Bloom et al, 2002).
So far, so good. But what we care
about is not R&D per se, as this is just an
input. We care about economic growth,
which will increase wages and
consumption. To tackle this problem, 
we had to develop a new model of
s
A strong R&D base 
helps a country to imitate
as well as innovate
Big ideas
‘endogenous growth’ that took account
of not just the obvious effect of R&D on
innovation but also the less obvious
‘second face’ of R&D, which fosters
diffusion of existing innovations.
Having more scientists helps the UK
catch up with leading-edge countries
because they can read and understand
new ideas, which can then be ‘absorbed’
more effectively in the UK economy. For a
country like the UK, which is sadly often
far from the technological frontier, this is
very important. It means that just sitting
back and letting other countries – the
United States, Germany, Japan and
increasingly China – do all the innovation
is unlikely to be the right strategy.
A strong R&D base helps a country 
to imitate as well as innovate. In a 
speech on the science budget last year,
David Willetts, the universities and
science minister, quoted CEP’s research 
in this area:
‘Some 95% of scientific research is
conducted outside the UK. We need to be
able to apply it here – and, in advanced
scientific fields, it is often necessary to
conduct leading-edge research in order to
understand, assimilate and exploit the
leading-edge research of others.
‘It is this absorptive capacity which is
crucial. Indeed, Griffiths, Redding and Van
Reenen have shown that higher domestic
business R&D spend also leads to greater
productivity being generated at home
from foreign R&D spend as well. And
there are powerful feedback mechanisms
on top of this – foreign companies cite the
quality of the public research base as one
of the main reasons for locating their own
internationally mobile R&D here.’
In a series of studies with Princeton
University’s Steve Redding (who was
director of CEP’s globalisation programme
from 2005 to 2010), we created an
econometric model for the whole OECD,
which showed how R&D stimulated
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productivity growth through both
innovation and imitation (Griffith et al,
2004). We combined this with our R&D
tax information to simulate the effects of
introducing an R&D tax credit in the UK.
We found that the benefits of an
R&D tax credit would easily outweigh the
costs, which implied that it could be a
successful policy (Griffith et al, 1999).
But we also cautioned that, as ever, the
devil was in the detail: making the tax
complicated could unwind its effects.
Our work appeared in academic
journals, policy pamphlets and the
printed and broadcast media. It was also
picked up by Dan Corry (who was to
become head of the No. 10 policy unit
during Gordon Brown’s term of office as
prime minister) when he was at the
Institute for Public Policy Research. The
proposals became part of Labour’s 1997
manifesto, which ushered in the first
ever R&D tax credit in the UK in 2001 –
initially just for small and medium-sized
enterprises, but later extended to firms
of all sizes.
In an illustration of the close
connection between academic ideas and
policy-making, our co-author on the tax
credit work was Nick Bloom, who was
then my PhD student. After graduating,
he was seconded to the Treasury to help
them introduce the tax credit and its
extension to large firms (in 2003). 
Nick led CEP’s research programme on
productivity between 2003 and 2006
and pushed forward the Centre’s
continuing investigations of the ways in
which policy can be used to stimulate
innovation. 
The R&D tax credit is under review by
the current government, but it looks like
it will remain a permanent fixture of the
fiscal scene. The UK’s R&D intensity
stopped declining in the mid-2000s,
which coincides with the bedding down
















coincidence and more rigorous
evaluations of the effects of the fiscal
incentives are needed. Nevertheless, 
the initial findings are encouraging and
our work in progress suggests that US
R&D tax credits raise firms’ market
values, productivity and innovation
(Bloom et al, 2010).
The R&D tax credit story is a useful
parable of the interaction of
fundamental economic research with
policy development and implementation.
It contrasts with the ‘patent box’, a
poorly targeted policy that consists of tax
benefits to the royalties on patents: such
rewards create few ‘spillovers’ as the
research is already done. The patent box
policy was proposed in the dying days of
the Labour government and it will waste
around £1 billion a year at a time when
the country can ill afford it. While this
looks like being another of the few
Labour policies that the government is
continuing, in this case the continuity 
is unfortunate. 
John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
Further reading
Nicholas Bloom, Rachel Griffith and 
John Van Reenen (2002) ‘Do R&D Tax Credits
Work?’, Journal of Public Economics 85:
1-31 (earlier version available here:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/textonly/people/
vanreenen/papers/gvrb15_wp.pdf).
Nicholas Bloom, Mark Schankerman and John
Van Reenen (2010) ‘Identifying Technological
Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry’, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 675
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0675.pdf)
Rachel Griffith, Stephen Redding and John
Van Reenen (1999) ‘Bridging the Productivity
Gap’, CentrePiece 4(3): 14-19.
Rachel Griffith, Stephen Redding and 
John Van Reenen (2004) ‘Mapping 
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(earlier version available here:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/textonly/people/
vanreenen/papers/wp0002.pdf).
Bronwyn Hall and John Van Reenen (2000)
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the Evidence’, Research Policy 29: 449-69













In material terms at least, life today is much better than it
was in the past for almost everyone living in a developed
nation. Think of all the items we have now that we did
not have then – from the internet and mobile phones to
more trivial items such as apple cinnamon cheerios, a
favourite American breakfast cereal.
These ‘new goods’ enrich our lives, and economists have
worked out just how much they are worth. They have
found that the internet is worth 2-3% of GDP, the mobile
phone 0.5-1% and even apple cinnamon cheerios raised
the welfare of Americans by 0.002% of GDP. Some
people really didn’t like their previous breakfast cereal. 
There are two stages in making a new good valuable to
society. First, it has to be invented, and we rightly
celebrate inventors throughout the ages. But inventions
also have to be adopted, and that means that they have
to offer good value to consumers. The people who come
up with ways of producing things more cheaply are also
important in making us better off.
We have investigated the scale of two such innovations:
mechanical cotton spinning and the motorcar assembly
line. Both led to sensational price declines and both
transformed what had been luxury items for upper class
consumption – Indian calicoes and motorcars – into items
of everyday consumption for a significant part of the
population. Workers on Ford’s Model T assembly line
could afford the cars they made; cotton spinners could
wear cotton shirts. 
Henry Ford did not invent the motorcar. Nor was his
Model T a particularly good motorcar. Ford was not 
even the first to use a moving assembly line. But he was
the first to ‘mass produce’ a car, a phrase he was also the
first to use.
The effects were impressive: the time taken to assemble a
Ford chassis fell from just under 12.5 hours in the spring
of 1913 to 93 minutes a year later. Greater efficiency led
to big falls in price: the Model T cost $950 in 1909 and
$360 in 1916, a fall in real terms of more than two thirds.
Ford realised his aim of building a car ‘so low in price that
no man making a good salary will be unable to own one’. 
Between 1908 and 1927 Ford sold a total of 15 million
Model Ts. It was so ubiquitous that in his 1945 novel
Cannery Row, John Steinbeck wrote that ‘Most of the
babies of the period were conceived in Model T Fords and
not a few were born in them.’ Ford also forced other car
firms to follow suit, so that between 1908 and 1923 the
average price of a car fell from $2,126 to $317 in 1908
terms. At the same time, annual sales rose from just
64,000 to 3.6 million.
One way of working out what Ford’s process innovation
was worth to the American people is to calculate how
much extra they would have had to pay to buy the cars
they did in fact buy, at the price prevailing prior to Ford’s
innovation. This measure is known as ‘social savings’. 
On that basis, Ford’s value to the American people was a
staggering 14.7% of GDP. 
Of course, we know that not everyone who bought a car
at $317 in 1923 would have been willing to pay $2,126
for it. We can estimate the shape of the demand curve,
and on that basis Ford’s innovation was worth around
1.8% of GDP. Although much smaller than our earlier
number, it still means that the average value of a Ford car
to consumers was around twice the price they had to pay.
Ford made himself rich and created lots of jobs, but most




Cotton and cars: the huge gains
from process innovation 
New inventions are good for economic growth, but equally important are
improvements in the way we make things – what’s known as process innovation.
Tim Leunig and Joachim Voth measure the impact of two such innovations –




processes of car and cotton was as
valuable as inventing the internet
The same is true of mechanising cotton spinning in 
the Industrial Revolution. Again, the fall in price was
spectacular. Cotton yarn that had sold for 107 pence a
pound in 1784 sold for just under 13 pence in 1820.
The social savings from mechanising cotton yarn
production were of a similar order of magnitude to those
of mechanising car production – 17.6% of British GDP. 
Of that, 7.5% went to British consumers, while the other
10.1% went to the people around the globe who were
now able to buy cotton goods more cheaply.
The consumer surplus estimate, this time simply for the
cotton used by British people, was around 2.6%, again a
substantial number. As the famous historian AJP Taylor,
himself born to a cotton family, once remarked, ‘Every
piece of cotton cloth is going to make someone warmer
or cleaner or more comfortable’. 
These two process innovations each produced gains for
consumers that were, even when estimated conservatively,
equal to the expenditure on them. Furthermore, the gains
took relatively little time to be realised.
Improving the production processes of these two existing
goods was as valuable in terms of consumer welfare as
inventing the internet, and much more valuable than
inventing mobile phones. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any
product that has been invented that has had a bigger
effect on welfare, as quickly, as these two improvements
in the way in which we make things. 
It is sometimes said – usually wrongly – that everything
worth inventing has been invented. But even if that were
the case, economic growth could and would continue.
Innovators would strive successfully, and to great effect, to
produce existing things more cheaply. This would raise our
standard of living, allowing us to buy more of the goods
that already exist or to spend less time at work while
having the same material standard of living.
Those who make existing goods cheaper should be
celebrated just as much as those who invent them in 
the first place. Both are crucial to understanding why we




This article summarises ‘Spinning Welfare: The
Gains from Process Innovation in Cotton and Car
Production’ by Tim Leunig and Joachim Voth, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 1050 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/dp1050.pdf).
Tim Leunig is reader in economic history at LSE
and an associate in CEP’s research programme on
globalisation. Joachim Voth is ICREA research
professor in the economics department at
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.
Henry Ford made
himself rich, but
most of the benefits
of his innovation
went to the people




just as much as those
who invent them in the
first place
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The heavy police presence at football matches
in England has reduced hooliganism in the
stadium – but at what cost in terms of both
policing budgets and under-protected places
elsewhere in the neighbourhood? Olivier Marie
examines the multiple effects of football
matches on crime.
Football matches:
the effects on crime
I
n the 1980s, football in England
became infamous for the
aggressive behaviour of some of
its fans, when hooliganism
tainted the ‘beautiful game’. 
To combat this affliction, security at
stadiums was greatly enhanced and the
policing of matches drastically increased.
As a result, crowd violence had
significantly subsided by the 1990s and
the hooligan stigma has all but
disappeared from English football today.
Still, the occasional scuffle is
inevitable. While the police are now
mostly able to prevent these from
degenerating, the physical proximity of
opposing fans has the potential to result
in violent crimes during home games. 
This possibility – which I call the
‘concentration effect’ – is the first channel
through which football matches can have
an effect on crime.
In recent years, a different public
safety debate has emerged, which is
concerned with the very high costs of
policing matches. These costs are only
partially covered by the football clubs
themselves. In 2009, during a discussion
of the costs of policing football by the
House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee, David Winnick MP noted
additional potential costs:
‘If I were involved in criminality of a
more sophisticated kind… would I not
work on the assumption that the police
will be fully occupied in a particular city –
it will not be difficult to find out when
these premiership games are being played
– and I could go about my unlawful
business?’
This question suggests the second
channel through which matches can affect
crime – the ‘displacement effect’. There
may be increases in violent crime and
property crime away from stadiums
because of the displacement of police
personnel assigned to match security
during a home game.
A third possible effect of football on
crime may stem from the ‘self-
incapacitation’ of some potential
offenders. This supposes that among the
thousands of fans attending or following 
a game, a not insignificant number of
them would have been criminally active 
if they had not been at the match. 
Self-incapacitation could therefore lead to
decreases in violent crime and property
crimes during both home and away
games, especially in neighbourhoods
where a high proportion of the population
supports the local team.
Football matches may thus affect local
crime rates through concentration,
displacement and self-incapacitation – the
directions of the three potential effects are
described in Figure 1. For researchers, the
difficulty is to disentangle the impact of
each of these effects as they occur
simultaneously. One solution is to consider
how they influence property crime and
violent crime separately during home and
away games. 
For example, to identify the self-
incapacitation effect, we simply need to
consider changes in local crime rates in a
football team’s neighbourhood during
away games. The displacement effect can
then be measured as the difference in
crime rates during home and away games
for property offences. The concentration
effect only affects violent crime during
home games but will be hard to measure
precisely. We would still be able to
attribute increases in violent offences
during home games as stemming from 
a mix of the displacement and
concentration effects.
To obtain measures of these effects,
we use the Metropolitan Crime Statistics
System, high frequency local area crime
data available for London for 1994-97.
The system contains information on the
time, location and type of offence for all
crimes recorded by the police in the capital
during this period. The data are
aggregated at the level of the 
32 boroughs in London into four six-hour
windows for property and violent crimes.
This is matched to detailed game
information for nine major football teams
with grounds in seven different London
boroughs (in parenthesis): Arsenal
(Islington), Charlton Athletic (Greenwich),
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Note: Upward and downward pointing arrows represent positive and negative effects through
each of the three channels – concentration, displacement and self-incapacitation – through which
home or away sporting events may affect local property crime and violent crime. Flat arrows
suggest no expected effect.
Figure 1:
Concentration, displacement and incapacitation
effects on property crime and violent crime during
home and away games
Property crime Violent crime
Home Away Home Away
Concentration 3 3 1 3
Displacement 1 3 1 3











This article summarises ‘Police and Thieves
in the Stadium: Measuring the (Multiple)
Effects of Football Matches on Crime’ 
by Olivier Marie, CEP Discussion Paper 
No. 1012 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp1012.pdf).
Olivier Marie of the University of Maastricht
is a research associate in CEP’s education and
skills programme.
Further reading
Mirko Draca, Stephen Machin and Robert
Witt (2008) ‘Panic on the Streets of London:
Police, Crime and the July 2005 Terror
Attacks’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 852
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0852.pdf).
Violent crime in the local
community does not 
increase on match days
except during a local derby
Chelsea (Hammersmith and Fulham),
Crystal Palace (Croydon), Millwall
(Lewisham), QPR (Hammersmith and
Fulham), Tottenham Hotspur (Haringey),
West Ham United (Newham) and
Wimbledon (Croydon).
For each match, we know the kick-off
time, the attendance, the type of game
(league or cup), the result including goal
difference, the number of red and yellow
cards issued and whether it is a local derby
(that is, when London teams play each
other). There are 571 home and 576 away
matches in the period for which the crime
data are available. 
To identify a match effect on local
criminal activity, we exploit the variation in
location and timing of both home and
away games. We focus on the impact of
large variations in attendance, controlling
for weather conditions and whether the
game is played on a holiday. We also net
out the possible influence of other
matches taking place at the same time,
the distance of each borough to the
stadium hosting a home game and the
distance of each away match.
Our results suggest that the level of
property crime falls by roughly 3% for
every extra 10,000 supporters attending
an away game. In accordance with our
conceptual framework (Figure 1), we
interpret the fall in property offences
during away matches as a pure self-
incapacitation effect.
But during a home game, property
crime rises by 4% for every extra 10,000
supporters. This suggests that there is an
important police displacement effect as
opportunistic offenders in the under-
protected areas of a borough take
advantage of the smaller probability of
detection to commit property crimes.
We find no measurable impact on
violent crime in the local community
except during a local derby. This suggests
some effect of concentration during
matches that are reputedly the ones with
the highest levels of animosity between
rival fans.
The overall conclusion from our
research is that the displacement of police
forces during football matches increases
property crime by almost 7% for every
extra 10,000 fans attending a game. This
is in line with a growing body of evidence
showing that police presence has an
important effect on reducing crime,
including CEP research on the impact 
on crime of extra policing following 
the 7/7 terror attacks in London (Draca 
et al, 2008).
The research also contributes to the
debate about the impact of policing of
private sporting events and the cost in
terms of the local community’s wellbeing.
This is especially relevant after August’s
riots and looting in London, which raised
questions about the ability of an already
stretched police force to maintain law and





tarting out in working life
is getting harder for young
people all over Europe.
Accessing the high-quality
training that eases the
transition and ensures
good career prospects is a particular
struggle for young people with below-
average school attainments. To understand
and act to improve the outcomes for these
young people, European governments
need good information on which to base
policy decisions.
Statistics collected by national
governments underpin such decisions and
these ‘headline numbers’ help to drive
policy debate. They can also send a
powerful message to young people and
their parents about the education and
training routes that lead to good labour
market transitions. 
Recognising the role played by
headline numbers in shaping policy and
aspiration, the official French government
advisory body on education – the Haut
Comité d’Education (HCE) – commissioned
Eric Verdier and me to coordinate a
comparative study of measures of
education outcomes and labour market
transitions of the least well-qualified group
England’s most widely used indicator of young
people’s education and labour market status is
the NEET category – ‘not in education,
employment or training’. Making comparisons
with how France and Germany measure 
school leavers’ progression and achievement,
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of young people. France, Germany and
England were selected for in-depth study.
Our study reveals both marked
differences between countries in how the
‘at risk’ group of low-attaining school
leavers is analysed statistically and the
choice of variables on which to base the
statistical description of school to work
transitions. But it also reveals some
important convergences.
France has moved away from a strictly
education-based classification of school-
leavers – traditionally a combination of the
final class completed and the highest
nationally recognised school diploma
obtained. The revised classification of
school-leavers derives from greater
commitment to the importance of a post-
16 diploma for all – awarded on success in
a two or three year vocational or general
course of education and/or training.
French statistics now distinguish
between ‘early leavers’ (sans qualification)
who have no recognised certification (9%
of 20-24 year olds in 2009); those (sans
diplômes) who complete a post-16 two or
three year course but do not pass the
examinations for a full certificate or
diploma (a further 9%); and those 
(82%) who complete and pass 
successfully (diplômés).
The employment rates for these 
three groups of young people are
published annually. They tell a powerful
story both to policy-makers and young
people about the vital importance of
gaining a full vocational certificate or
general diploma or, failing that, at least
completing the course.
The message for teachers, parents and
school students is clear: a full vocational
qualification reduces the probability of
unemployment by almost two thirds
relative to early leavers; and achieving 
the Bac diploma (the French equivalent of
A-levels) reduces it by a factor of four.
Even staying the full two or three 
year vocational course without passing
the examination is beneficial for
employment chances. 
France relies, perhaps excessively, on
school-based nationally standardised
vocational and general education for
labour market preparation. This 
provision has inadequate capacity to react
to rapidly changing labour market
demands. French apprenticeships
overcome this problem but they can
provide for only a small proportion of
those in vocational education.
Nevertheless, the emphasis on
successfully completing a two or three
year course of vocational or general study
at school produces a young population in
which two thirds hold a Bac diploma and
a further 20% have two or three years of
vocational training. 
The contrast with Germany could not
be greater. Well over half of all school
leavers expect to enter apprenticeship.
School marks are of importance for these
16 year old German school leavers only
because higher marks increase the
likelihood of gaining an apprenticeship
place.
Without the labour market recognition
that the apprenticeship qualification
confers, the employment outlook for
German school leavers is grim. ‘Not
qualified’ in Germany equates to 
‘not trained through apprenticeship’. 
German labour market transition statistics
are overwhelmingly devoted to analysing
and understanding access to
apprenticeship places. 
For almost 20 years, following the
shock to the economy of the reunification
of Germany in 1990, German states and
the federal government struggled to meet
the demand for apprenticeship places from
young people. Many with low level school
qualifications faced long ‘waiting periods’












The most high profile measure of the
German government’s competence in
education policy was and is the annual
‘matching’ of apprenticeship applicants to
places. Only in 2010 were apprenticeship
places close to matching demand from
applicants. In 2009, 15% of 20-29 year
olds had not received apprenticeship
training and consequently faced poor
labour market outcomes. The remaining
85% had completed either a three year
apprenticeship or three years of full-time
education post-16. 
Education statistics published in
England do not identify a ‘no
qualifications’ category of young people,
as in France, nor a group without
recognised occupational training, as in
Germany. The most widely used indicator
of young people’s education and labour
market status is the NEET category – ‘not
in education, employment or training’.
Yet NEET young people are not a ‘no
qualifications’ category. Nearly three
quarters of the 15% of the age group
classified as NEET in 2010 had some 
GCSE passes. Of a smaller group – those
who have been NEET for more than 
12 months – over half had some GCSE
passes (see Figure 1). 
The difference from France and
Germany is the emphasis in England on
participation regardless of content or value
– any job, any training, any course
removes a young person from the ‘at risk’
category. In both France and Germany, the
message from the headline number on
school leavers’ transition to work is the
importance of progression and
achievement – progression to a recognised
qualification through an academic or
vocational pathway in France and
progression through apprenticeship in
Germany. 
These measures help to set clear goals
for 16 year old school leavers, clear goals
that are lacking in England. In contrast to
France and Germany where 85% reach
Level 3 equivalence, only half of all 19
year olds in England achieve any Level 3
qualification. Could these differences in
goal-setting account for this failure?
According to Alison Wolf’s
independent review of vocational
education commissioned by the UK’s
Department for Education and published
earlier this year, ‘at least 350,000 young
people in a given 16-19 cohort are poorly
served by current arrangements. Their
programmes and experiences fail to
promote progression into either stable
paid employment or higher level education
and training’.
As the Department for Education sets
about implementing the Wolf
recommendations for 16-19 education
and training, the negative message of 
the NEET category needs to be replaced by
a headline number that reflects and
projects the more ambitious goals that
Wolf proposes. 
This article is based on Les élèves sans
qualification: La France et les pays de
l’OCDE by Ekaterina Melnik, Martine Möbus,
Noémie Olympio, Hilary Steedman, Rémi
Tréhin-Lalanne and Eric Verdier, a study
commissioned by the HCE and coordinated
by Eric Verdier and Hilary Steedman
(http://www.hce.education.fr/gallery_files/
site/21/106.pdf).
Professor Eric Verdier is at the University 
of Aix-Marseille. Dr Hilary Steedman was a
senior research fellow at CEP from 1994 to
2004 and is currently an associate in the
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The negative message of
NEET should be replaced
by a headline number
reflecting more ambitious 
goals for young people
without qualifications
Source: DFE Statistical Bulletin B, 1 July 2010
Figure 1:
NEET status by age 18 by highest qualification at age 16
In England, any job, any
training, any course
removes a young person
















House prices and school quality:
evidence from state and 
private education in Paris
How much are parents willing to pay to get their children
into what they perceive to be a better school? The answer
to this question has important implications both in terms
of school admission policies and urban planning.
Residence-based school admission rules often aim at
ensuring a degree of social diversity in schools. But a
higher willingness to pay for better schools implies that
residential choices are more heavily influenced by the
perceived quality of local schools. Contrary to the original
objective, this phenomenon will tend to reinforce the level
of social segregation between schools and undermine the
effectiveness of school catchment areas as a policy tool to
reduce educational inequalities.
If parents care about the quality of education and if
children are assigned to schools based on their place of
residence, then differences in school performance should
be at least partly captured in house prices. The housing
market therefore provides an indirect way of measuring
the average willingness to pay for better schools.
Following this intuition and analysing data from the UK
and the United States, empirical studies (including work by
CEP’s Steve Gibbons and Stephen Machin) have found
that there is often a significant house price premium
attached to an increase in the average test scores of 
local schools.
A limitation of these studies is that they restrict the
analysis to state schools, ignoring the influence that
private schools might have on residential choices. Since
admission to private schools is not usually subject to a
residence requirement, private education provides an
outside option for parents who are not satisfied with the
quality of the neighbouring state schools. It seems likely
that the willingness of parents to pay for better state
schools in a particular neighbourhood is smaller when the
number of local private schools is higher.
Our study explores this issue by evaluating how house prices
react to the quality of education offered by local schools,
both state and private. We analyse comprehensive data on
middle schools (those for pupils aged 11 to 14) and housing
market transactions in Paris over the period 1997-2004. 
The organisation of secondary schooling in Paris is a useful
context for analysing how the interaction between state
and private schools influences residential choices because
it combines a residence-based system of assignment to
state schools with a well-developed and almost entirely
publicly funded network of private schools.
Parents who reside in a given neighbourhood have hardly
any control over the choice of their child's state school
because each catchment area contains only one school
and because very few dispensations are granted to
applicants who live outside the catchment area. In this
context, parents who want to avoid sending their children
to a low-performing local state school can either move to
another area or seek admission to a private school.
What makes the latter option attractive is that in addition
to being entitled to select their pupils from anywhere in
the city, private schools usually charge relatively modest
fees (between £1,000 and £2,000 a year). As a result,
private schooling accounts for about a third of total
secondary education enrolment in Paris.
Empirically, the issue of estimating the impact of state
school performance on house prices is a challenge for
researchers. As in most big cities, the best state schools in
Paris tend to be located in the most expensive areas. This
feature, however, does not necessarily imply that houses
are more expensive because local schools are better.
In fact, the causality might go the other way round.
Wealthy neighbourhoods attract households of high socio-
economic status whose children tend to perform better at
school than those in more deprived areas. This simple
mechanism induces a positive correlation between
apparent school quality and house prices, even if parents
do not take account of the performance of local schools
when deciding to move into a neighbourhood.
Our research addresses the causality challenge by
It is now widely understood that the quality of state schools in a
neighbourhood has an impact on local house prices. Analysing data
for Paris, Gabrielle Fack and Julien Grenet have looked deeper into
this link by exploring how the presence of private schools influences
parents’ willingness to pay to live near good state schools.
in brief...
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comparing the value of house sales across middle school
catchment area boundaries – that is, sales of houses
located close to each other but assigned to different state
schools.
The key justification for this approach is that on average,
flats located in the immediate vicinity of school
attendance boundaries have similar attributes (period of
construction, number of rooms, etc.) and, by definition,
belong to the same neighbourhood. The only significant
difference between them is that they are assigned to
different state schools. Hence differences in cross-
boundary house prices can be interpreted as a direct
measure of the unequal valuation of the corresponding
state schools. 
Based on this empirical strategy, we find that the
perceived quality of state middle schools has a significant
impact on the house prices. Using various measures of
school performance, we find that differences in school
quality translate into differences in house prices of a
similar magnitude to those found in the UK and the
United States. Our analysis suggests that roughly 5% of
local variations in house prices in Paris are explained by
differences in the perceived quality of state schools. 
We also show that the impact of state middle schools on
the housing market varies with the local density of private
middle schools. The effect of school quality is more
pronounced for residences in areas with a low density of
private schools and is non-existent for areas with the
highest density of private schools. Our results suggest that
in areas where private schools are scarce, the capitalisation
of state school performance in housing prices is in the
same order of magnitude as the individual cost of a
private school four-year tuition fee in areas where they are
numerous, that is about €4,000 at the average flat price.
These findings are consistent with the idea that by
offering a relatively cheap outside option to parents who
are willing to avoid the constraints of strict catchment
areas, private schools tend to mitigate the impact of state
school performance on house prices.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest 
that the co-existence of state and private schools is an
important dimension to take into account when designing
school admission policies. In particular, the effect of
alternative state school admission rules (strict residence-
based assignment, relaxed school zoning, open enrolment,
etc.) on residential and school segregation, pupil
performance and educational inequalities depends
crucially on how the housing market incorporates state
and private school performance.
This article summarises ‘When do Better Schools
Raise Housing Prices? Evidence from Paris
Public and Private Schools’ by Gabrielle Fack
and Julien Grenet, Centre for the Economics of
Education Discussion Paper No. 119
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/cee%20dps/
ceedp119.pdf).
Gabrielle Fack is at Universitat Pompeu Fabra
in Barcelona. Julien Grenet of the Paris School
of Economics is a research associate in CEP’s







Growing numbers of university students in 
Britain and the United States are staying on after
their first degrees to invest in a postgraduate
qualification. Joanne Lindley and Stephen
Machin document this trend and assess the
impact on wage inequality – among graduates 




altered the typical path
followed by university
graduates. The norm
used to be that after obtaining an
undergraduate degree, people would
finish their studies and enter the labour
market. These days, many more students
stay on to invest in postgraduate
education. Indeed, by 2009 just over 10%
of the workforce in Britain and the United
States – and more than a third of all
graduates – had a postgraduate
qualification. 
We have documented these trends in
postgraduate education and how they
relate to rising wage inequality in the two
countries. It is now widely understood that
despite rapidly growing numbers of
university-educated workers, increased
relative demand for their skills has been a
key driver of overall wage inequality. Our
research reveals that the changing
composition of the graduate labour force
– and widening wage differentials within
this group – has also been a key feature of
rising inequality.
Figure 1 shows changes in the
proportions of all graduates and
postgraduates in the labour force during
the past 30 years, as well as the changing
share of postgraduates among all
graduates. In the United States, the
graduate share of employment has
increased steadily, rising from 24% in
1980 to 36% in 2009. In Britain, the
graduate share doubled between 1996
and 2009, going from 14.5% to 29%.
Focusing on postgraduates, there has
been a sharp increase in both countries: in
the United States from 7.5% to 13%
between 1980 and 2009; and in Britain
from 4% to 11% between 1996 and
2009. The more rapid increase in the share
of postgraduates compared with college-
only workers means that the postgraduate
share among graduates has increased in
both countries: from 31% to 35% of US
graduates between 1980 and 2009; and
from 30% to 37% of British graduates
between 1996 and 2009.
At the same time as postgraduates
increased their employment share, their
relative wages also rose. Figure 2 shows
how the wage differential between those
with a postgraduate qualification and
The boom in 
postgraduate education
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Trends in postgraduate/college-only percentage
wage differentials
those with just an undergraduate degree
has increased through time.
It is evident that postgraduates have
significantly strengthened their relative
wage position in both countries. In the
United States, the postgraduate/college-
only wage differential has risen sharply
over time, more than doubling from
around 14% in 1980 to just over 30% 
by 2009. In Britain, the postgraduate/
college-only gap is lower but it has risen
from 6% in 1996 to 13% by 2009.
So it seems that the relative labour
market fortunes of postgraduate and
college-only workers have evolved
differently through time. The clear pattern
that emerges in the two countries is of an
increase in both the employment shares
and wage differentials for postgraduates
vis-à-vis college-only workers. Rising
supply coupled with rising relative 
wages means that relative demand seems
to have shifted over time in favour of
postgraduate workers compared with
college-only workers. 
Previous research has connected the
relative demand shifts for different
education groups that have underpinned
increased wage inequality to measures 
of technological change. The usual
approach is to relate the two in terms of
changes across industries through time.
This work reports that measures of
technology – such as R&D, innovation,
computer usage and investment in
computers – have been strongly correlated
with the increased demand for more
educated workers.
Our research also considers this,
looking at shifts in labour demand
separately for postgraduate and college-
only workers, and making comparisons
between these two groups of graduates




It turns out that there is a stronger
connection between increases in the
relative demand for postgraduates and
measures of technological change than for
college-only graduates. Analysis of
changes in employment shares and
changes in computer usage in 215 US
industries and 51 British industries shows
that, for both countries, there is only a
positive correlation for postgraduates.
That shifts in labour demand towards
postgraduates seem to be (at least in part)
driven by technological change is also
supported by cross-country patterns of
changing labour demand and technology.
The analysis shows that bigger shifts in
demand occurred in the same industries in
Britain and the United States and that the
changes in computer usage are very much
concentrated in the same industries for
the two countries.
More evidence that employers are
increasingly demanding postgraduates can
be seen by comparing the skill sets
required by the jobs of postgraduate and
college-only workers. Table 1 shows
postgraduate/college-only differences in
their estimates of cognitive skills, problem-
solving skills, people skills, firm-specific
skills, the tasks they use computers for
and how routine their jobs are.
It is clear that both sets of graduates
do jobs with high skill and job task
requirements. But in key skills areas, the
levels are significantly higher for
postgraduates. For example,
postgraduates have higher numeracy
levels (especially advanced numeracy),
higher levels of analysing complex
problems and more specialist knowledge
or understanding.
Breakdowns of computer usage are
also striking. Postgraduate and college-
only workers both report high levels of
computer usage, but using computers to
perform complex tasks is markedly higher
among the postgraduate group.
So it seems that postgraduates possess
different skills and do jobs involving
different (usually more complex) tasks than
college-only workers. This is in line with
the finding that relative demand has
shifted faster in favour of the
postgraduate group, and it appears to be
an important aspect of rising wage
inequality among college graduates.
We have also compared the
occupations of postgraduate and college-
only workers. With more recent data, we
can consider different forms of
postgraduate degree. Table 2 shows the
top five occupations in terms of their
share in employment for college-only
workers and postgraduates with master’s
degrees and doctorate degrees.
There are several notable features of
the top five occupations of these three
groups of workers. First, the top five tend
to be different occupations in the two
countries. Second, while the occupational
categories are not quite the same across
countries, there are some clear similarities. 
Third, the postgraduate occupations
are more segregated than the college-only
occupations. For postgraduates, in the
United States the top five (out of 497
occupations) account for almost half of
employment (49%) and in Britain the top
five (out of 353 occupations) account for
around 45%. The college-only distribution
is a lot more dispersed, with the top five
accounting for only 16% of employment
in the United States and 20% in Britain.
Table 1:
Skills and job tasks suggesting that postgraduates in
Britain are more in demand than college-only graduates 
Skill/job task Postgraduates College-only
Cognitive skills
Literacy 4.067 3.763
Simple numeracy (basic arithmetic) 3.606 3.583
Advanced numeracy (maths and statistics) 3.004 2.715
Problem-solving skills
Thinking of solutions to problems 4.311 4.277
Analysing complex problems 4.179 3.880
People skills
Making speeches/presentations 3.658 3.148
Teaching people 4.023 3.843
Dealing with people 4.658 4.684
Firm-specific skills
Knowledge of products/services 3.817 3.831
Specialist knowledge or understanding 4.704 4.548
Computer usage
Using a computer or computerised equipment 4.607 4.384
Proportion that do not use a computer 1.9% 4.5%
Simple (general purpose) computer users 7.4% 10.9%
Moderate computer users 42.8% 48.6%
Complex computer users 47.9% 36.1%
Routine nature of job
Performing short repetitive tasks 2.689 2.890
Variety in job 4.315 4.195
Sample size 257 1,095
Source: The 2006 Skills Survey. With the exception of the proportions using computers, the
numbers are based on a scale of 1-5 for questions on task performance – ‘How important is this
task in performing your current job?’ – for which the choices are 1 ‘not at all important’, 2 ‘not











Overall, our findings on increasing
divergences within the group of workers
who go to university offer new evidence
on how the changing education structure
of the workforce has contributed to rising
inequality. Our focus is on increasing
divergences within the group of workers
who go to university.
We document that there have been
significant increases in the number of
workers with a postgraduate qualification
and that, at the same time as this increase
in their relative supply, their relative wages
have risen strongly compared with workers
with only a college degree. Trend increases
in the relative demand for postgraduates
have acted as a key driver of increasing
within-graduate inequality and of overall
rises in inequality.
The relative demand shifts in favour of
workers with postgraduate qualifications
are strongly correlated with technical
change as measured by computer usage
and investment. It turns out that over the
This article summarises ‘Rising Wage
Inequality and Postgraduate Education’ 
by Joanne Lindley and Stephen Machin,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 1075
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1075.pdf).
Joanne Lindley is a senior lecturer in
economics at the University of Surrey.
Stephen Machin is a professor of economics 
at University College London and CEP’s
research director.
Table 2:
Top five occupations – college-only, master’s degrees and doctorates
United States, 2010, 497 detailed occupations
COLLEGE-ONLY MASTER’S DEGREE DOCTORAL DEGREE
Top five Employment Top five Employment Top five Employment
occupations share occupations share occupations share
1 Elementary and middle 4.6% 1 Elementary and middle 11% 1 Post-secondary teachers 21%
school teachers school teachers
2 Managers, all other 3.6% 2 Secondary school teachers 4.7% 2 Physicians and surgeons 10.7%
3 Accountants and auditors 3.3% 3 Managers, all other 4.3% 3 Lawyers, judges, magistrates 10.2%
and other judicial
4 Chief executives 2.3% 4 Post-secondary teachers 3.6% 4 Psychologists 3.7%
5 First-line supervisors/managers of 2.2% 5 Education administrators 3.1% 5 Pharmacists 3.6%
retail sales workers
Britain, 2010, 353 detailed occupations
COLLEGE-ONLY MASTER’S DEGREE DOCTORAL DEGREE
Top five Employment Top five Employment Top five Employment
occupations share occupations share occupations share
1 Primary and nursery education 5.1% 1 Secondary education 4.8% 1 Higher education 20.7%
teaching professionals teaching professionals teaching professionals
2 Marketing and sales managers 4.5% 2 Software professionals 3.6% 2 Medical practitioners 11%
3 Nurses 3.6% 3 Marketing and sales managers 3.5% 3 Bioscientists and biochemists 7.1%
4 Software professionals 3.2% 4 Management consultants, actuaries, 3.2% 4 Researchers 3.2%
economists and statisticians
5 Information and communications 3.1% 5 Information and communications 3.1% 5 Software professionals 3.1%
technology managers technology managers
years as computer use has become more
widespread in most workplaces, the
principal beneficiaries of this revolution
have not been all graduates, but those
with postgraduate qualifications. As such,
there has been a strong connection
between the increased presence of
postgraduate workers in the labour force
and rising wage inequality over time.
The principal beneficiaries of the
computer revolution have not been










teachers in South Korea paid at the 78th
percentile of their country’s income
distribution whereas those in United States
are paid at only the 49th percentile? And
do these massive variations in the way
different countries treat their teachers
matter for the outcomes of their pupils? 
Answers to these questions are at the
heart of the educational policy debate and
we can learn a lot about the relationship
between teacher quality and pupil
outcomes from cross-national
comparisons. The issue is especially
relevant in the context of pressures to
reduce public spending. Most countries
devote a sizeable proportion of their
budgets to education – and around 70%
of that money goes on teacher salaries.
Our research considers the
determinants of teacher salaries across
OECD countries and examines the
relationship between the real and relative
levels of teacher remuneration and the
measured performance of secondary
school pupils over the last 15 years.
There are two potential explanations
as to why teachers’ pay may be causally
linked to pupil outcomes. The first is that
higher pay will attract more able
graduates into the profession. As the
potential supply of teachers rises because
of the higher pay on offer, entry into
teaching as a profession will become more
competitive. This in turn will mean that
the average ability of those entering the
job will rise. Once recruited, higher relative
pay and/or more performance-related pay
may provide teachers with stronger
incentives to improve their pupils’
educational outcomes. 
The second mechanism is more subtle
If you pay peanuts, do you get monkeys? If
teachers were better paid and higher up the
national income distribution, would there be 
an improvement in pupil performance? 
Peter Dolton and Oscar Marcenaro-Gutierrez
examine the enormous variation in teachers’
pay across OECD countries and its 





– namely that improving teachers’ pay
improves their standing in a country’s
income distribution and hence the
national status of teaching as a profession.
As a result of this higher status, more
young people will want to become
teachers. This in turn makes teaching a
more selective profession and hence
facilitates the recruitment of more able
individuals.
Higher status and higher pay are
invariably linked but the two can provide
separate driving forces to engineer better
recruits to the profession. The key
hypothesis is that better pay for teachers
will attract higher quality graduates 
into the profession and that this will
improve pupil performance.
The most comprehensive sources of
comparative information about teachers in
different countries are the OECD’s annual
‘Education at a Glance’ reports. These
publications provide information on
starting salaries, salaries after 15 years 
of teaching experience and salaries at the
top of the profession.
The relative supply of teachers in a
country is measured by the number of
teachers as a fraction of the labour force
and the pupil/teacher ratio in the
education system. An additional supply
factor relates to the proportion of the
stock of teachers who are women. We
also control for the number of teaching
hours supplied, since having a lower
number of teachers can be compensated
for by them working more hours.
We measure the nature of a country’s
investment in education by the level of
educational expenditure as a fraction of
GDP, controlling for the rate at which a
country is growing, since clearly this will
constrain its possible investments in
education. The changing nature of the
increase in pupil performance. Likewise, a
5% increase in the relative position of
teachers in the income distribution would
increase pupil performance by around 
5-10%.
What are the policy implications of
these findings? Most obviously, if a
government is concerned with educational
outcomes, then it should be aware that
the quality of its teachers is of
fundamental importance. We suggest that
the route to hiring teachers from higher
up the ability distribution is to pay them at
a higher point in the country’s income
distribution.
How could this be achieved? 
A country with a stock of low quality
teachers cannot simply raise the pay of all
teachers immediately and expect the
quality of teaching to improve. The
existing stock of teachers would clearly
have an incentive to appropriate these









demand for teacher services is measured
by the demographic growth in the size of
the population of school age.
To examine the relationship between
teacher remuneration and educational
attainment, we use the internationally
comparable results from the OECD
Programme for International Student
Assessment (2000, 2003 and 2006) and
Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study (1995, 1999 and 2003). 
Figure 1 provides an insight into the
relationship between teacher salaries and
pupil outcomes, showing a clear statistical
association between higher relative
teachers’ pay and higher standardised
pupil scores across countries.
Our research with aggregate country
data supports the hypothesis that higher
pay leads to improved pupil performance.
As an indication of the relative size of this
effect, we find that a 10% increase in








  1-12 months
$60,000$50,000$40,000$30,000$20,000$10,000
● Turkey

































Teachers’ salaries in US dollars at purchasing power parity
Figure 1:
Pupil score percentile as a function of teacher
salaries after 15 years of experience
A 5% increase 
in the relative position of 
teachers in the income
distribution would increase pupil
performance by around 5-10%
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become better teachers. And while the
quality of new recruits to the profession
would rise as a result of this upward shift
in relative pay, it would take a long time –
30 or so years – to change the quality of
the whole stock of teachers.
The answer then must be to consider
how teacher quality can be raised
gradually. If the government were to
ratchet up starting pay, this would secure
better quality new teachers. But improving
the stock of existing teachers would
require continued professional
development and in-service training and/or
attempting to fire the worst teachers.
Such policy measures are not within
the scope of this study, but there is a
wealth of research evidence about them
as possible remedies to improve the
existing stock of teachers. One solution is
to provide an incentive mechanism for
existing teachers to improve quality by
paying them according to the percentile
performance (in value added terms) of
their pupils. Another possible solution is to
increase the rate at which teachers’ pay
rises with their level of experience.
Another dimension of the problem 
is the time scale over which any
improvement in pupil outcomes is 
sought. If replacing existing teachers with
ones of higher quality would take too
long, then a quicker fix might be to
reduce the pupil/teacher ratio or increase
pupil contact hours by simply employing
more teachers from the pool of 
inactive teachers.
Our analysis finds a clear trade-off
between pupil/teacher ratios and teachers’
pay across countries – that is, countries do
not necessarily have to pay higher salaries
to secure better pupil outcomes. But if a
country is not prepared to pay teachers
relatively well, then it will have to go a
long way down the road of reducing class
sizes to compensate them – in short,
governments and educational
administrators need to know that there is
‘no free lunch’ here.
The policy implications of our findings
are relevant to the recruitment of teachers
and the improvement of educational
standards. The link we find between
teacher quality and high educational
standards has logical implications for any
government’s commitment to recruit,
retain and reward good teachers. In this
regard, it seems that increasing teacher
salaries (and the speed at which they can
reach higher pay levels within a particular
pay structure) will help schools to recruit
and retain the higher ability teachers that
schools need to offer all pupils a high-
quality education.
At a wider policy level, improvements
in education appear to be a common
factor behind economic growth in 
recent decades in all OECD countries. 
The increase in human capital accounted
for more than half an extra percentage
point of growth in the 1990s compared
with the previous decade. One 
clear way to improve the stock of
human capital is to invest in higher
quality teachers. 
This article summarises ‘If You Pay Peanuts,
Do You Get Monkeys? A Cross-country
Analysis of Teacher Pay and Pupil
Performance’ by Peter Dolton and 
Oscar Marcenaro-Gutierrez, Economic 
Policy 26(65): 5-55, January 2011
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
j.1468-0327.2010.00257.x/full).
Peter Dolton is a professor of economics at
Royal Holloway College, University of London,
and a senior research fellow in CEP’s
education and skills programme. Oscar
Marcenaro-Gutierrez is at the University 
of Malaga.











Britain seem to be very
unequal. This is true if we
look at average earnings,
employment, education and almost any
other socio-economic outcome. 
Take ‘gross value added’ (GVA) per
person, potentially a good indicator of
living standards in different places. In 2005
(a point in time chosen to be sometime
before the peak of the boom), the highest
ranked regions in Britain were West Inner
London and Berkshire with GVAs of
£44,050 and £39,850 respectively. The
lowest ranked were Liverpool and
Blackpool with GVAs half those in the
South East: £19,800 and £21,050. 
These examples are representative of a
broader trend: the top ranked 10% of
regions have GVA at least 50% higher than
the bottom ranked 10%.
Regional policy, urban policy, even
neighbourhood policy are all largely based
on concerns about these kinds of
disparities. But these figures are simply
aggregates of the outcomes for people
who live and work in these places. Without
further information, we do not know
whether the outcomes for people currently
living in Manchester would be any different
if they lived and worked in London.
We also have no way of knowing if the
productivity of London and Manchester
would change if these movements of
people actually took place. Similarly, we do
not know whether replicating the
economic, policy, institutional and
environmental regime of London in
Manchester would change anything
without moving people. In short, it is hard
to work out what these differences mean in
terms of the economic advantages and
disadvantages that a place offers to the
people who live and work there.
It is also easy to assume from looking at
these aggregated figures that disparities
between places are big drivers of disparities
between individuals. But this clearly need
not be the case. For individuals, the
disparities within local areas could far
exceed those between different areas. 
Our research offers new empirical
evidence on the nature, scale and recent
evolution of economic disparities in Britain
(Gibbons, Overman and Pelkonen, 2010).
We focus on disparities in individual wages,
because wages are linked to productivity
and they are an important cause of
variation in living standards. We also have
very good individual data on wages.
Using these ‘micro’ data, we assess the
extent of and persistence in wage
disparities across labour market areas in
Average earnings vary widely across the
regions of Britain, a fact that has prompted
many decades of policies aimed at reducing
regional disparities. But as Henry Overman
and Steve Gibbons demonstrate, such
variation reveals little, especially if we ignore
regional differences in the cost of living and
availability of local amenities.
Unequal 
Britain:
how real are regional disparities?
Who you are is much
more important than
where you live in
determining earnings
Britain. We examine to what extent these
area differences arise because of differences
in the characteristics of people who live in
different places – ‘sorting’ – versus different
outcomes for the same types of people
living in different places – ‘area effects’. We
also consider the extent to which these
differences across areas contribute to overall
individual wage disparities. 
Our research finds that between 1998
and 2008 there were few changes in area
disparities, despite many policy
interventions. It also turns out that who
you are is much more important than
where you live in determining earnings (and
other outcomes). Area effects only play a
small role in the overall wage dispersion.
We can tell this by looking at wage
differences for individuals with similar skills
living in different areas, and comparing
them with wage differences for people
with different skills living in the same area.
The larger area wage disparities that appear
at first sight, when taking a superficial look
at the data, arise through sorting of
individuals and the area-level aggregation
of the individual skills.
So this research suggests that wage
disparities across local areas in Britain are
pronounced and very persistent but that
much of these disparities are driven by
‘people’ rather than ‘place’. Regardless,
such disparities between different cities and
different labour markets concern policy-
makers because they seem to imply
differences in standards of living and
economic welfare. But spatial earnings
disparities are uninformative about
differences in people’s overall wellbeing
unless we take account of differences in
the cost of living and the availability of 
local amenities. 
In further research, we consider the
extent to which higher post-tax earnings
are offset by higher housing costs (Gibbons,
Overman and Resende, 2011). Figure 1
shows the results for a sub-set of 
157 labour market areas. Both wages 
and housing costs are in £1,000s per year.
The wage gaps between areas are
estimated from the wage gains and losses
for individuals who move between areas;
and housing costs are measured from
house prices, adjusting for differences in
housing quality. 
The solid upward-sloping line
corresponds to the case where housing
costs rise one-for-one with wages. Given
that most people in Britain are free to
choose where they live, higher wages
should translate directly into higher house
prices for places that are otherwise
identical. That is, we should expect 
£1 higher wages to mean housing costs
rise by £1 per person. In fact, on average
the empirical relationship in Britain is close
to this theoretical benchmark. 
But as Figure 1 shows, there is also a
great deal of variation around this general
relationship. What drives this variation is
the fact that other things are not equal.
Places differ in the local amenities that they
provide to households. These amenities
include crime, weather, pollution,
entertainment and natural beauty.
For example, places with high housing
costs relative to wages must offer some
kind of local amenity – better restaurants
and entertainment perhaps, or lower crime
and less pollution – which helps to offset
the fact that real income is low in the area.
Similarly, places that offer poor local
amenities must ‘compensate’ people by
offering low house prices relative to wages.
This suggests that we can use cost-minus-
earnings differentials as a measure of
quality of life.
Rather than focusing on area rankings,
it is more useful to consider what this
approach tells us about the trade-off faced
by people in Britain. The dashed line in
Figure 1 does this by showing how the
relationship between house prices and
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Places with lower wages in Britain tend
to be rural but as wages increase, house
prices tend to fall not rise (so the
relationship between house prices and
wages is downward sloping). This suggests
that places with high levels of consumer
amenities tend to have few productive
advantages for firms.
In these places, consumer demand for
local amenities drives up land costs and
house prices, but since these areas do not
offer productive advantages, wages must
also be lower to induce businesses to locate
there. Households in the lowest wage
places are willing to pay high house prices
because they are compensated by higher
local amenities.
When you look at the places we are
talking about – for example, West and East
Cornwall, Devon and Kendal – this clearly
makes sense. These are places in which
‘underperformance’ and a lack of
development has gone hand-in-hand with
preservation of rich natural amenities that
are highly valued by consumers, even
though wages are low. This high valuation
of natural and recreational resources,
reflected in housing costs, is borne out in
more detailed analysis we have done
(Gibbons, Mourato and Resende, 2011).
In contrast, moving to higher wage
areas – on the right-hand side of Figure 1 –
we tend to see house prices increasing as
wages rise (so the relationship between
house prices and wages is positive). This
suggests that local producer benefits tend
to drive the relationship for higher wage
areas. Firms drive up land costs in these
labour markets, and workers must be
compensated with higher wages to induce
them to live there, but with house prices
higher to offset the benefits of higher
wages.
Note though, that on the far right-hand
side of Figure 1, in London and the South
East, amenities for consumers and
productive advantages for firms tend to be
positively correlated across labour markets.
Housing costs rise steeply, more than one-
for-one with wages, indicating that
consumers are willing to pay over and
above the expected wage gain to live in
these areas – though here the amenities are
quite different from those they expect to
find in places like the South West of
England and the Lake District.
So across Britain, our research shows
that increased living costs (particularly of
housing) tend to offset completely
increased wages for the average
household. In the lowest wage areas, which
are mostly rural, differences in amenities
drive the trade-off between wages and the
cost of living. In higher wage areas, which
are mostly urban, differences in firm
productivity drive the results.
What are the implications of this
research for urban and regional policy in
Britain? We highlight four:
Area averages are not very useful
indicators of wellbeing: Differences in
average incomes across neighbourhoods or
regions reflect the interaction of area
effects and the sorting of people. High
wages tend to be offset by high house
prices or low quality of life so income
differences on their own are not very useful
indicators of differences in wellbeing.
Policy should be assessed by its
impact on people not places: People
trade off wages, cost of living and
amenities, and they can move in response
to changes in any of these. As a result the
impact on observed area differences offers
a very poor guide to the overall effects of
policy on individuals.
In practice, policy has probably
been too heavily focused on places:
Area effects mean that living in some
places negatively affects individual
outcomes. The usual response is to try to
improve ‘bad’ areas. An alternative would
be to focus on improving outcomes for
people who live in bad areas.
The focus on area differences biases
policy towards the first response.
Unfortunately, evidence suggests this has
not been successful as area effects are very
persistent. This argues for a greater focus on
improving outcomes for individuals
including, possibly, removing barriers that
prevent people relocating to better areas.
Policy has paid too little attention to
house prices and amenities: Planning
decisions play a key role in generating area
disparities because people and firms sort in
response to both wages and local costs.
Similarly, disparities in amenities matter
because high quality of life compensates
people if wages are low relative to the cost
of living. Local policy-makers have policies
that directly affect house prices and
amenities and relatively few that affect
wages and employment.
At a time of constrained finances and
weak economic performance it is more
important than ever that urban and regional
economic policy focus on sensible objectives
using cost effective policy levers. Reflecting
these four key insights when considering
how policy should be targeted and
developed would be a useful step in the
right direction.
The high valuation of
natural amenities is
reflected in high housing
costs in relatively low
wage places like Cornwall
and the Lake District
Henry Overman is director of the Spatial
Economics Research Centre (SERC),
professor of economic geography at LSE and
a research associate in CEP’s globalisation
programme. Steve Gibbons is research
director of SERC, reader in economic
geography at LSE and a research associate in
CEP’s education and skills programme.
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set at the Lisbon summit
of 2000, have not been
met by all member states.
The Mediterranean countries in particular
have failed to achieve the objective of
getting at least 70% of the working age
population into employment. And the jobs
performance of the continent as a whole
continues to lag behind the United States.
What is the future of work in Europe?
One way to answer this question is to
go behind the aggregate figures and
compare which sectors are creating jobs.
The transatlantic comparison is interesting
for two reasons. First, the United States is
still the technologically most advanced
country and a leader in developing new
kinds of jobs and new sectors of economic
activity. Think of Silicon Valley and the
dot.com boom. 
Second, had Europe’s performance
followed the United States more closely
over the last 30 years, the employment
ambitions of European leaders would have
been met. But the employment histories
of the two continents deviated, starting
sometime in the early to mid-1970s.
To make the argument more concrete,
consider the two continents in the period
just before the Great Recession of 2008-
09. In the first eight years of the 2000s,
more than three quarters of Americans
but only two thirds of Europeans aged
between 15 and 64 were in employment.
Coupled with higher American enrolment
rates in higher education, this shows that
a lot more Americans were active outside
the home than their European
counterparts.
Looking deeper into the transatlantic
employment gap, three broad sectors
account for virtually all the differences (see
Figure 1). First, services that are provided
directly to the public, such as retailing.
Second, services that are mainly business-
to-business, such as finance, insurance
and commercial property And third,
services related to health and education,
which are mostly for self-preservation and
self-improvement.
In the late 1970s, the annual hours of
work in each sector in the United States
exceeded those in the eurozone countries
by about 70 for everyone aged between
15 and 64. But by the early 2000s, the
extra hours worked annually by Americans
had jumped to 120 in health and
education, 100 in business-to-business
services and nearly 80 in services provided
to the public. Moreover, most of the US
gains were in health, retailing and a
general ‘business services’ sector that
includes accountants, management
consultants and expert advisers.
Why are Europeans not creating
enough jobs in these sectors? Take
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Employment in the European Union is still
falling short of the objectives set by the
continent’s leaders more than 10 years ago.
Nobel laureate Chris Pissarides explains why
Europe remains behind the United States in job
creation, particularly in business services and
the health and education sectors.





retailing. Most people who have been
shopping in the United States know that it
is a lot easier to get assistance in
American shops than European ones.
Economists attribute these differences to
taxation and regulations that make
employing retail assistants more expensive
in Europe, combined with the fact that
there is an alternative to employing more
assistants: self-help.
There is a trade-off in shopping.
Customers can choose to go to shops with
lots of assistants, which are usually more
expensive because their costs are higher.
Or they can go to cheaper shops where
they are likely to spend more time finding
what they want themselves and then
spend even longer waiting to pay.
In Europe, because the costs of
employing shop assistants are higher than
in the United States, shops manage to
keep their costs down by shifting part of
the assistant’s job to the customer. IKEA,
the home products retailer, could not have
been born in the United States.
Something similar is happening in
business services. American companies are
using external advisers and specialist
services much more frequently than
European companies, because it is cheaper
and quicker to set up and operate such
businesses in the United States. Instead,
European companies might go without
some services or they might provide them
internally.
The advantage of external services is
not only in employment but also in
efficiency. By specialising in business
services, independent providers are able to
improve efficiency and provide a better
service for other companies. So Europe is
not only losing out in employment by not
making it easier to set up and operate
business services, we are also losing in
productivity.
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The gap in annual hours between the United States and
the eurozone in three industrial sectors
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Chris Pissarides, professor of economics at
LSE, has been a cornerstone of life at CEP
since its foundation in 1990 and for many
years led the research programme on
macroeconomics, particularly unemployment.
He was co-recipient with Peter Diamond and
Dale Mortensen of the 2010 Nobel Prize in
Economics, ‘for their analysis of markets with
search frictions’.
This article summarises his lecture at the
Fourth Lindau Meeting on Economic Sciences
in August 2011, an event that brought
together 17 of the 38 living economics
laureates with nearly 400 top young
economists from around the world.
Swedish company. It is also not a
coincidence that eating out in Sweden is
much more expensive than – and probably
not as common an occurrence as – eating
out in, say, Italy.
Is this the future of work in Europe?
Will our taxes have to go up to subsidise
jobs in the sector that will surely feel most
pressure for job creation? European
citizens have a tough decision to make.
But before they even have the luxury of
addressing that issue, they must sort out
their debt problems. Otherwise the social
care system that is so deeply rooted in
Europe’s culture will become untenable.
UNEXPECTED ITEM IN THE BAGGING AREA
The hours of work devoted 
to jobs in health and education in
Sweden exceed those in the United
States – but the taxes needed to








































Annual hours of work in health and education
But the biggest growth in the gap
between the United States and the
eurozone is also the most controversial.
Employment in health has grown much
faster in the United States than in Europe,
even though the European population is
ageing faster than the American one. Why
is that?
The jobs in the American health sector
are not only in medical services but also in
care, for both young children and older
people. But the cost of these services has
also risen enormously. Is the reason that
we are not creating enough jobs in
healthcare services in Europe the fact that
we are not allowing costs to rise faster? 
I would like to think that this is not 
the reason.
In Europe, we have a more caring
social system supported by public policy,
and much of the cost of education and
healthcare is borne by the state. Demand
for these services, especially for health, will
increase in the future, partly because of
our ageing populations, but also because
with rising living standards we expect
better personal services and better
healthcare.
How can our governments meet the
costs of these services? The United States
has shown one way: by allowing costs to
increase and letting the private sector take
the initiative. Sweden and the other
Scandinavian countries have shown
another way: by increasing taxes and using
the revenue to subsidise jobs in healthcare.
The hours of work devoted to jobs in
health in Sweden exceed even those in the
United States, while hours worked in the
eurozone fall well short of both (see Figure
2). But the taxes needed to finance these
jobs in Sweden are very high compared
with those in other European countries.
Job creation in other sectors, such as
retailing and home repairs, has suffered,
which means that overall Sweden is behind
the United States. So even within Europe,
it is not a coincidence that IKEA is a
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Why do smart people make bad decisions?
How come the best laid plans can go so
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